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HOUSING INSPECTIONS WITHOUT WARRANTS
State ex rel. Eaton v. Price,1
168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958)
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus following his arrest for
refusing to permit a housing inspector to enter his home pursuant to a
city ordinance' which authorized inspections to determine compliance with
minimum housing standards. He contended that the ordinance was un-
constitutional because no warrant was required for entry against his will.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a
housing ordinance authorizing inspections at reasonable hours and upon
showing of appropriate identification meets federal and state constitu-
tional safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Housing codes have been utilized by many cities in recent years to
help prevent urban blight.3 A typical housing code prescribes minimum
standards respecting the condition, the maintenance and the occupancy of
existing dwellings and has the ultimate purpose of protecting the health
and safety of the entire community.4 The effectiveness of a housing code
depends upon the adequacy of its system of enforcement; but no matter
what method of enforcement is employed an efficient inspection system is
necessary to insure its success. 5 In a recent study of fifty-seven housing
codes it was found that nearly two thirds of the cities considered a right
of entry on the part of the inspectors necessary.6
The general area of search and seizure has been extensively liti-
gated, but only a few recent cases have considered the question of
housing inspections made without a warrant and against the will of the
occupant. Prior to 1949 it seems to have been taken for granted that
such inspections are within the proper exercise of the police power. The
first case which directly met the issue was District of Columbia v. Little.7
Defendant in that case was convicted of interfering with a health in-
spector who had attempted without a warrant to make an inspection of
defendant's dwelling upon receipt of a complaint alleging the existence
1 This habeas corpus proceeding should have been captioned: "In the
Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Earl Taylor." State ex rel.
Smilack v. Bushong, Sup't, 93 Ohio App. 201, 112 N.E.2d 675 (1952), aff'd, 159
Ohio St. 259 (1953). Eaton was Taylor's attorney.
2 DAYTON, OHIO, CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES, no. 18099, § 806-30 (1954).
3 As of 1955 more than seventy cities had comprehensive housing codes.
Gazzolo, Municipal Housing Code, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 317 (1956).
4 SIEGEL & BROOKS, SLUM PREVENTION THROUGH CONSERVATION AND REHABILI-
TATION 18 (1953).
5 Id. at 1.
6 HHFA, UR3AN RENEWAL BULL. No. 3 (1956). From a total of fifty-seven
housing codes included in the study it was found that thirty-eight authorized a
right of entry onto the premises while forty-four had provisions permitting
inspection.
7 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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of unsanitary conditions therein. The court of appeals held that the
regulation authorizing the inspection was unconstitutional.8 This court
regarded an inspection by a health officer as no different, in essence, than
a search for evidence of crime. In the area of criminal investigations the
Supreme Court has firmly established the requirement under the fourth
amendment that, in the absence of special exigencies during the per-
formance of duty, a search warrant must be obtained prior to an invasion
of the privacy of a man's home.'
A 1956 Maryland Court of Appeals decision 1" upheld a conviction
where appellant had refused to allow an attempted inspection of his
rooming house in accordance with provisions of the Baltimore City
Code." The court asserted that such inspections do not constitute a
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment nor of
the state constitutional provision corresponding to the fourth amendment.
The holding was based on the proposition that the constitutional guaran-
tees against unreasonable searches and seizures do not prohibit reasonable
searches and seizures.
12
Aside from a South Carolina dictum which expressed the opinion
that ". . . there is doubt whether such an entrance [over the objection of
the occupant] would come within the constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches . . . ,""1 the District of Columbia, Maryland and
Ohio cases appear to be the only reported decisions which have considered
the legality of making an inspection of this type without a warrant.
The "reasonableness" of a regulation promulgated under the police
power of the state is measured by weighing the importance of the public
benefit which the legislation seeks to promote against the seriousness of
the imposition on the rights of those being regulated.' 4 If a right of
entry is necessary for effective enforcement of housing codes,' 5 what
minimum safeguards are essential to protect the individual from un-
reasonable invasions of his right of privacy? Certainly the use of a
8 Aff'd on nonconstitutional grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1949). The Supreme
Court held ". . . that respondent's statements to the officer were not an 'inter-
ference' that made her guilty of a misdemeanor under the controlling District
law." At the present time there is no ruling of the Supreme Court of the United
States as to whether in federal jurisdictions a housing inspection may lawfully
be made without a search warrant.
9 United States v. Jeffers, 348 U.S. 48 (1951) ; McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Thurman
v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934) ; People v. Schmoll, 383 IIl. 280, 48
N.E.2d 933 (1943); State v. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404, 4 P.2d 1094 (1931).
10 Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
11 BALTIIORE, MD., CrrY CODE art. 12, § 120; art. 5, § 120, ch. 12, para.
1202; art. 9, § 260 (1950).
12 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
13 Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
14 Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 At. 595, appeal dismissed, 229 U.S.
506 (1936).
15 See note 6 supra.
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search warrant where the occupant refuses entry is not the only means
of preserving the inviolability of a man's castle. Indeed, under present
law the use of a search warrant for housing inspections is in many cases
neither possible nor practicable.' 6
The code provision involved in Givner v. State authorized the in-
spector to demand entry only during daylight hours; and the ordinance in
question in the Eaton case permitted the inspection "at any reasonable
hour." It is submitted that any inspection authorized under the provisions
of a housing code should be limited to reasonable hours. In the absence
of extreme emergency an occupant should not be compelled to submit to
an inspection under circumstances of undue inconvenience.' 7
Another provision common to the ordinances involved in the two
above-mentioned cases is that the inspector must exhibit proper identifying
credentials before requesting entry. That a person has a right to be
apprised of the authority under which an inspector demands to enter his
home is so well settled as to require no further discussion.' 8
In addition, the Maryland and Ohio courts require that the in-
spections shall not be used "as a cover to conduct a search for any vio-
lations of the criminal law or for any purpose other than the preservation
of health and safety. .. ,"" Judge Herbert, in Eaton v. Price, takes
special note of the fact that under the Dayton ordinance a prosecution
for failure to remedy the violations observed on the first inspection or
for failure to comply with an order to vacate must be based upon evi-
dence obtained on a ranspection. Whether a prosecution based upon
evidence obtained on this reinspection, if the latter were made without
a warrant and against the will of the occupant, would be valid was not
before the court and remains undecided."0 The clear implication is that
10 1n his dissent in District of Columbia v. Little, supra note 7, at 23, Judge
Holtzoff discusses the problem: ". . . there is no existing statute under which a
health inspector, a plumbing inspector, or a building inspector may obtain a
warrant authorizing him to enter a building for the purpose of a routine inspection.
It has always been assumed that no search warrant is necessary. . . .Moreover,
even if an Act providing for such search warrants should be placed on the statute
books, how can an inspector make a showing of probable cause as a basis for the
issuance of a warrant for the purpose of an ordinary, routine inspection?" Com-
prehensive inspections on an area-by-area basis have proved more effective than
haphazard inspections based only upon receipt of complaints. SIEGEL & BROOKS,
supra note 4, at 11, 52-53.
17 See United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1948). No
constitutional right is violated by a statue, an ordinance, or a regulation providing
for the inspection, during business hours, of places of business dealing with
drugs or food.
18 Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940). The purpose of service
of a search warrant is not only to authorize officer to make search, but to inform
the one named and suspected, if he is on the premises, of what is being done
and why.
19 Givner v. State, supra note 10, at 503, 124 A.2d at 774.
2 0 State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 137, 151 N.E.2d 523, 532
(1958).
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the information gathered upon the original inspection conducted without
a warrant is not to be used in a criminal prosecution, not even in a pro-
ceeding under the penal provisions of the ordinance which authorized the
inspection.
Although it is not explicit in the opinion, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia may have been influenced somewhat in its de-
cision of the Little case by the vague wording which characterized the
code provision. In sharp contrast with the Baltimore and Dayton codes,
the District of Columbia regulation required neither a showing of cre-
dentials nor an inspection at a reasonable hour.
The Maryland and Ohio courts have decided that inspections of
private dwellings conducted under the authority of housing codes are not
unreasonable invasions of the privacy of the home provided that the fol-
lowing minimum requirements are met: (1) inspections may be made
only at reasonable hours; (2) inspectors must properly identify them-
selves; and (3) evidence obtained during the original inspection may not
be used as a basis for criminal prosecution. Housing codes are designed
to preserve the health and safety of our communities. It would appear
that the home owner's right to privacy must yield to this extent in favor
of the public interest.
William L. Clark
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